In an ever divided and volatile Middle East, what will be the impact region and the world at large if Iran does gain the ability to produce and maintain a nuclear arsenal and if indeed Iran does go nuclear, should someone intervene and how?
This essay will first attempt to explain why states such as Iran would desire to go nuclear, focusing on internal political forces, technological resources, domestic security and regional hegemonic desires. This essay will then try analyze the impact on the region if any, and what can or should be done about their proliferation.
Why would Iran want to go nuclear? Although many might think the answer is simple, to case the destruction, its sworn enemy by its own hand, but perhaps the answer is more complicated than that. States frequently acquire or at least attempt to acquire nuclear weapons for a number of political reasons. Political pressure can come not only from outside the country but also in. One may as how political pressure is exerted from outside of the country that may drive states to build and test nuclear weapons but often it is the pressure form other states that are a driving force in the development. Both Iran and the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea are prime examples of this. While the outside world develop U.N. Security Council sanctions and more often embargos, the isolation only drives “rogue states” further pressure their goal. It is precisely these sanctions that make leaders want to assert them selves even more vigorously in shows of swagger. Iran for example has been had a growing policy roll in the middle east especially with the invasion of Afghanistan since the U.S. invasion but many in the west do not give it the credence or respect in foreign policy circles that the mullahs feel they deserve. How does the perceived foreign policy impotence influence demotic pressure to develop nuclear weapons?
Often when countries are marginalized, there is a large public out flow of anger and resentment. This is particularly applicable in the case of Iran, who still holds resentment, albeit justified, for the roll the U.S. government played in the coup de tat that ousting of the elected Nationalist president Mohammed Musaddiq and resulted in the instillation of the Shaw. The domestic pressure provided by the people is only intensified when the U.S. labels their state as rogue or a member of the “axis of evil’. Internal pressure also comes from military leaders who are always pushing for increased military spending in hopes that their budgets will not get cut the following year or and from politicians who use national pride as a means to secure votes. Although domestic pressure may provide political willingness to develop nuclear weapons, what are the effects of technological development?
According to Singh and Way, “once a country develops the latent capacity to develop nuclear weapons, it is only a matter of time until it is expected to do so”.[1] Thus as Iran has developed into a relative modern nation by Middle East standards, it does not seem unreasonable that they would indeed seeks to develop a modern weapons arsenal. The revenue that Iran has amassed from its rich oil resources have offered Iran a spring board to modernity, increasing its scientific development, increased literacy and economic prosperity, all tools necessary for the development of a modern nuclear state. With the increase of scientific discovery and literacy standards, it becomes cheaper for state to develop nuclear weapons and thus increase the likely hood of them doing so. Increased scientific it seems provide a state with an avenue to produce, but what are the domestic security concerns that make states like Iran move from the discovery state to the acquisition and development stage?
The willingness rather than the ability to produce nukes can perhaps be explained in realist terms best, security concerns. According to Waltz, this because of the “threat environment”, states are highly likely to build nuclear arsenals when there is an increased external security threats. The threat environment however will result in a security dilemma as other rival states attempt to level the playing field by building their own nuclear weapons to stifle said rivals military edge. In the case with Iran, it could be argued that their building of nuclear weapons is merely a response to the uneven distribution of power in the region, as Israel, Iran’s regional rival, already possesses an estimated 20 to 60 nuclear weapons. By realist arguments, it is only logical that Iran would indeed seek to build its own stockpile to increase its own security. In addition, with the end of the cold war, there is no bipolarity of superpowers, which provide a security guarantee. With no structured security alliance, Iran has only itself to rely on to provide security agenized attack form states that are proceeded to be credible threats, namely the United States or by extension, its alley, Israel to whom the United States transfer its own nuclear weapons technology to. Israel’s own action in the region can only see by Iran as a threat as it is has historically bombed other countries suspected nuclear enrichment sites with little to no Security Council action. Also, many states in the region see Israel as carrying out on ongoing war agenized Islam, only personified by the ongoing occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, leaving Iran and it ruling Mullahs no alternative to see to build up a credible military deterrent from what it see as the aggressor in the region. In edition to defensive ability, how might the acquisition of nuclear weapons increase Iran’s regional hegemony?
According to Sagan, nuclear weapons provide and a states military ability can serve the same function as that of an airline or Olympic team[2], providing a state with an air of legitimacy with out the need of costly war, on the cheap. These weapons serve as a litmus test for modernity and can be used as symbol to their peers that they are the most powerful and legitimate in the region. In Iran’s case, this symbolism is particularly important given its historic record of foreign interference in its domestic political affairs and US assistance to Iraq in the Iran/Iraq war. Since the 1979 revolution, Iran has been struggling to reshape its economy, pride and regional standing by improving their oil production capability and updating its infrastructure. The vast amount of revenue that it has amassed has provided Iran with the ability to indeed become a modern state. The production capability does not just provide Iran with economic power, but also gives it resource power over its trading partners in the region and perhaps across the world. The ability of Iran to have nuclear weapons and an economic grip on its regional partners places it right at the center at regional politics and Iran is happy to be a part of it, perhaps striving for a position much like the roll that China plays in East Asian politics.
The internal political forces, technological resources, domestic security and regional hegemonic desires have shaped Iran’s desire to obtain nuclear weapons, but what security implications does that have on the region and what is anything should be done about it?
According to Waltz, since the post war world, nuclear weapons have been a instrument that have worked for peace because the cost of war is so incredibly high, the act of war itself is in fact discouraged by the perceived horrific outcome[3]. History has show that now two states who possess nuclear weapons have ever engaged in an active war with each other. In essence there is no empirical evidence to suggest that any new state that was to gain the technological ability to enrich fissile material and subsequently build a bomb. Iran therefore, is no more likely than any other state to use its nuclear weapons agenized a rival, Israel included, because the ensuing second strike would result in catastrophic amounts of collateral damage to the civilian populace that it would make the initial strike out of the question. Iran’s rhetoric of destroying Israel aside, there is little factual evidence to suggest that this posturing is indeed a prelude for Iranian actions to come, not if, but when, they finish building their nuclear arsenal. So what about the safety of the region at large?
The spread of nuclear proliferation will very likely result in increased regional security if states that share borders have weapons. Historical evidence this can be seen if one looks at the relationship between China and Russia, though bitter rivals, they never once used their weapons on each other, but rather, had very limited military incidents once they had both developed the thermal missile capabilities. The same set of out comes can be assumed would result if Iran was also to acquire nuclear weapons. Perhaps even greater regional cooperation would evolve is Iran were to gain “the bomb” and become a regional hegemony by extending a regional security pact to smaller more venerable nations. Although the advent of Iran going nuclear may increase regional security, states such as Israel and the United States are sure to oppose it, but what could they do to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons?
Many experts agree, any attempt to bomb enrichment facilities such as the gas centrifuges near located near Natanz would only slow Iran’s weapons development process and not stop it. It is commonly believed that Iran has come too far in its technological development to stop Iran agonized its will and may even give the Iranian government the political support to complete the process at an increased rate with increased domestic support and an increased sense of national pride. Likewise, if the Bush administrations handling of North Korea in their attempt to develop nuclear weapons, there is no doubt that isolation and sanctions are not effective in persuading a regime to give up its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Isolation rather, give North Korea more incentive to develop WMDs and ultimately test them to get the United States to reengage in direct negations. Iran, unlike the DPRK, has a vast about of oil revenue and as such, isolation is likely to have a much milder effect. Direct engagement is likely the only possible course of action for the U.S. and world community to talk, America’s military forces are spread think around the planet, and perhaps even if they we not, Iran is no Iraq and it is not likely that our forces would be able to secure a geographic area the size of Iran. So where does that leave us now?
It may be now surprise as to why Iran or other states may want to go nuclear, internal political forces, technological resources, domestic security and regional hegemonic desires can readily be satisfied by their development. It remains abundantly clear that we can not take steps that have been historically in dealing the development of nukes in “rogue states”. What is apparent is that if the U.S. and their regional allies do indeed want Iran to cease and desist, they will need to engage Iran directly, much like Moammar Kadafi of Libya, to get them to voluntarily disarm. But perhaps the spread of nuclear armed states is not the worst thing that can happen, sure we may loose some leverage, but is the gain in regional piece not worth the discomfort it may cause?
Bibliography
[2] Scott D. Sagan Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter, 1996-1997), pp. 74
[3] Kenneth Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better,” Adelphi Papers International Institute for Strategic Studies, No. 171 (1981).
